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Empirical research has consistently shown that, on average, men are paid
higher wages than women. At the same time, men enjoy more leisure time than
women. We develop a model of private provision of family public goods to
analyze whether the wage gap and the leisure gap are related. Within a nonco-
operative framework, different bargaining power situations within a couple are
considered which lead to different empirical hypotheses. With data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel we focus on the leisure gap and the wage gap
within double earner couples and in this way are able to discriminate among the
theoretical models. Our random effects estimates show that husbands have a
stronger bargaining position and this advantage results in them enjoying, other
things equal, more leisure time than their wives.
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The UN Human Development Report’s review of time use in 31 countries in 1995 documents
thefactthatwomenconsistentlyenjoylessleisuretimethanmen(UnitedNations, 1995)with
women working longer hours (paid and unpaid) than men in nearly every country. In the
German Time Budget Survey for 1991/92 the overall leisure gap between men and women
amounts to more than 20 minutes on an average day (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995). When
it comes to working adults the gender-speciﬁc difference increases to more than half an hour
for those in full-time jobs. In this group, men enjoy 12% more leisure than women. Half
an hour may seem a small amount of time, but it is worthwhile noting that it took several
decades for contracted daily working time to fall by this amount.
There is also an empirical wage gap between men and women. On average, men are
still paid about a fourth more than women with variations across branches and occupations.
The unadjusted earnings gap has been hardly decreasing over the last decades (see the data
in O’Neill (2003) for the US and in Statistisches Bundesamt (2002) for Germany). Even
the adjusted wage differential, e.g. after controlling for invidividual and job characteristics,
amounts to 5-17% of male earnings across the European Union (see European Commission,
2002). If men earn higher wages, one may argue that it may be efﬁcient that men specialize
in market work and women in household work, leading to the traditional intra-family time
allocation. But this distribution of working hours to market and household work due to the
different productivity (wage) does not necessarily imply that employed men work in sum
shorter hours than their working wives, e.g., that men enjoy more free time than women.
Mostempiricalstudiesonthewagegaportheleisuregapconcentrateonthegapsbetween
men and women after controlling for invidividual and job characteristics like education, work
experience, having children, etc. To our knowledge, no study analyzes, theoretically and
empirically, the relationship between the wage gap and the leisure gap in a gender related
way, and furthermore does this within couples. This is the central focus of our paper.
So far, the relationship between the wage gap and the leisure gap has been debated mostly
in social science research. A sociological approach, represented by Huber and Spitze (1983)
and later extended by Hochschild (1989), is based on the assumption that family time use
arrangements are as much a cultural phenomenon as they are an economic one. By analyzing
a sample of employed couples drawn from a larger national study by the University of Michi-
gan in 1981, Hochschild found that women did more household work the less they earned
relative to their husbands. But even if they had higher labor incomes than their husbands,
they still performed “their” household tasks and did not enjoy increased leisure. Low-earning
women increased their leisure time by working shorter hours.
Hochschild concluded “that the leisure gap between wives and husbands reﬂects some-
thing more than a pragmatic adaptation by couples to the higher wages of American men -
an interplay of gender strategy.” (Hochschild, 1989, p. 278). She interpreted this behavior
as following a principle of balancing: wives who earn more than their husbands compensate
2them for their “loss of face” by not delegating more household work. This ﬁnding is sup-
ported by a study of Brines (1994) who argues that an economically dependent husband does
less household work the more he depends on his wife for income. Established domestic gen-
der roles imply that once a man’s ﬁnancial identity as the breadwinner has been undermined
he cannot afford to further weaken his position by doing household work.1
The economic theory of time allocation within the family was initiated by Becker (1965,
1976). In Becker’s theory a couple maximizes (joint) utility when both partners allocate their
time according to their comparative productivity advantages. That is, if the husband has a
higher wage than his wife he will specialize in paid employment and she will specialize in
household production, while possibly holding a part-time job. The larger the wage differen-
tial, the greater the difference between the amount of time the man and the woman spend at
home. Since Becker did not distinguish between household work and leisure, no direct link
between wages and the leisure gap can be drawn in this setting.
In recent years, more sophisticated game-theoretic models have been developed where
husband and wife interact as individual family members. Manser and Brown (1980), McEl-
roy and Horney (1981) and Ott (1992) propose Nash bargaining models where divorce or
remaining single are possible threat points. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) consider the case
where the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative outcome within marriage. Kon-
rad and Lommerud (1995) explicitly model a noncooperative game of private provision of
a public good, while Konrad and Lommerud (2000) mix cooperation and noncooperation at
different decision stages in lifetime. In the emerging Nash equilibria there is, in general, un-
derprovision of the family public good. Vagstad (2001) presents a similar model where the
spouses have different comparative advantages in the production of family public goods.2
In most of these models, husband and wife basically maximize the consumption of two
goods, a private good that is paid for by individual labor income, and a public family good
that is generated by household production. This does not allow for predictions about different
time uses at home. There is no distinction between time spent at home looking after the
children and time spent watching TV. The aim of our approach is to model leisure time in
an explicit way by including leisure as a distinct good in our model. Thus, we have a model
with three time uses: (paid) labor work, (unpaid) household work and private leisure time.3
Leisure or private time is deﬁned as time spent on self-determined activities. Since these
are activities that are pursued for their own sake, they must be exclusively performed by that
same person and cannot be delegated to anyone else and then be transferred. This concept of
leisure is called the third person criterion (see Schäfer and Schwarz, 1996, and Ott, 1998).
Whereas labor refers to all activities that are inputs of a production process, the output of
1See also Daly (1996).
2For a survey of noncooperative family models see Lommerud (1997).
3It is sometimes difﬁcult to classify to which category a certain time use belongs. Juster and Stafford (1991)
survey the problems of measurement that arise when dealing with time allocation and summarize the em-
pirical evidence.
3which is interpersonally transferable, leisure does not yield any such outputs that could be
traded in return for other services. Sport activities, watching TV or eating and sleeping, for
instance, are considered leisure activities, since they have to be performed by oneself.
Compared with intrinsically private leisure, we assume that time spent in paid market
work and time spent in unpaid household work generate family public goods, to which both
spouses contribute (see Leuthold, 1968, and Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990). Time spent in
paid labor yields wage income that can be regarded as a family public good since housing,
transportation, the family car, the TV set, and, in general, the family’s living is purchased
with that income. Time spent in unpaid labor also yields a public good to the family. The
household production of child care, a clean house and a neat garden are public goods pro-
vided privately by each partner.
Intheirexchangemodelofthehousehold, AppsandRees(1996)alsodistinguishbetween
market work, household production and pure leisure. However, they assume the household
equilibrium allocation to be Pareto efﬁcient and do not model the decision process explicitly,
as is our focus. Since the couple’s decision about income and about who will be the main
breadwinner is such a long reach decision, we believe that a noncooperative framework better
captures the full commitment character of this decision than a cooperative game.4 Most
economic models assume simultaneous Nash behavior with exogenous labor or household
productivity inﬂuencing the outcome.5 We develop a model with a simultaneous game where
both spouses have a similar bargaining position.
One could argue that in reality, there is usually one spouse who has a stronger bargaining
position, be it because she/he is older and so is able to make the ﬁrst move in time, or be it
because it is socially accepted that she/he is the dominant partner. Thus, we also present an
alternative, sequential model with a decision making process where one partner chooses ﬁrst.
Without loss of generality, we will assume that it is the male spouse who chooses in the ﬁrst
place.
This is also supported by a study of “investments of time” by men and women in the U.S.
which found men to have more control over their time (Juster (1985)). This was attributed to
a social structure where male roles are more purposive and female roles are more residually
determined. In most households, women’s wage income is still viewed as the “second”
income. It seems plausible to assume that men “dominate” the family decision process on
time allocation by deciding ﬁrst. Frank (1978) develops a job matching model with a “male
chauvinist family location decision rule”, where the husband optimizes his individual job
search in the ﬁrst place. Given his decision, the wife optimizes her (now also individual) job
search to maximize joint labor income, which is a public good for both spouses. Finally, men
also have a timing advantage because they tend to be older than the women they marry. They
4Even if both partners made a cooperative choice, the outcome of the noncooperative game would be interest-
ing in itself, because it might be a threat point in a cooperative game.
5Konrad and Lommerud (2000) endogenize the productivity decision and analyze its effect on the Nash bar-
gaining between household members.
4have had more time to search for a job or have longer job tenure, which leads to a higher
income.6
In this sequential version of our model, the husband decides on his contributions to the
public goods ﬁrst and thereby sets the restrictions for the follower, his wife. By choosing his
time allocation in the ﬁrst place, the husband becomes the Stackelberg leader in a noncoop-
erative game over household time allocation.
In both the simultaneous and the sequential contributions game, intra-household bargain-
ing over the distribution of household resources therefore implies bargaining over individual
leisure time. Housing, child care etc., on the contrary, are consumed publicly. It is assumed
that they are not associated with distributive conﬂicts between the partners.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a private provision model with no private utility of
one’s contribution as introduced by Cornes and Sandler (1984) and Bergstrom et al. (1986).
Our model is also related to Buchholz et al. (1997), who analyze a game of private provision
of public goods when two individuals contribute to a public good sequentially. In contrast to
their model, where income is transferable, in our setting time cannot be transferred between
the partners. Bolin (1996) also considers a similar Stackelberg model in a noncooperative
setting with two goods. His noncooperative model explains the unequal division of family
work as the outcome of a Stackelberg game between the spouses.
The simultaneous and the sequential contributions game lead to different, testable empir-
ical hypotheses. First, we are able to discriminate between the model where both spouses
have the same bargaining power and the model where one spouse has a dominant position.
Second, we can estimate the effect of this bargaining power on intra-household allocation.
It turns out that even for the reference case where male and female earn equal wages,
the husband generally enjoys more leisure than his wife. This result contradicts the simul-
taneous contributions game and supports the sequential, Stackelberg-like game where the
husband exploits his strategic Stackelberg advantage. In this situation, women outearning
their husbands bear a double time burden of market work plus household work as described
in the sociological literature. Our empirical results thus conﬁrm the sociological ﬁndings that
there is more to a gender-speciﬁc leisure gap than the wage differential between women and
men.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we outline the basic model. Section 3 and 4
analyze the simultaneous and the sequential Stackelberg game. An empirical analysis of the
relationship between the wage and the leisure gap for German data is given in Section 5. The
robustness of the results are discussed in the following section. The last section summarizes
the main results.
6For the role of the age difference in a marriage matching model see Elul et al. (2002), for the relationship
between income and job seniority see Topel (1991).
52 The model
Weconsideramodelofintra-familytimeallocationinwhicheachspousehasanexogenously
given time endowment T. This “time budget” T is allocated among three time uses: paid
market work g, unpaid household work h and leisure l:
T = gi+hi+li, with i = f,m. (1)
Market work g earns the household an income wmgm+wfgf, where gm and gf denote his
and her contributions to household income and wm and wf denote his and her exogenous and
observable wages. In our model it is irrelevant where the household’s money income comes
from: a dollar from his income is as valuable as a dollar earned by her. This linearity in
the contributions to money income allows for situations where one partner might in principle
be the only money earner. This might be the case in a situation with a very large wage
differential (see below on corner solutions). Both spouses earn the same utility from market
income given by G = G(wmgm +wfgf). One can think of the household income as a joint
bank account where both spouses’ income is transfered to and from which the rent, food, the
TV set etc. is paid.
The husband and the wife also contribute to the household good production hm and hf
(male and female). The household production technology is more general, allowing for cross
effects between his and her contribution. This is the case for the production of goods and
services like bringing up the children, cooking, tidying up, etc. Both spouses also derive the
same utility from household production, which we denote with H = H(hm,hf).
Finally, the remaining time li = T −gi−hi,i = m, f is the individual leisure time of the
spouses. This is the time they spend reading a book, watching TV, surﬁng the net, etc. Here
we also assume that husband and wife have the same leisure utility given by V(li),i = m, f.
Notice that both spouses derive the same utility from market income (G), household
production (H) and leisure (V). Besides, market income and household production are family
public goods to which both partners contribute. The decision problems of the two partners
are interrelated due to this setting where family public goods are provided privately.
The utility functions are given by:7
Um(gm,gf,hm,hf,lm) = G(wmgm+wfgf)+H(hm,hf)+V(lm) and (2)
U f(gm,gf,hm,hf,lf) = G(wmgm+wfgf)+H(hm,hf)+V(lf). (3)
The assumption that the utility associated with each of the three time uses enters total
utility in an additive way is certainly restrictive, but it is made for the sake of tractabil-
ity of the model. The functions V and G are assumed to have positive but decreasing ﬁrst
7We use capital letters G, H and V to denote the contribution to utility from market income, household
production and leisure. Small letters gi,hi,li,i = m, f represent the spouses’ time allocated to those time
uses. An subscript used with capital letters will denote, as usual in the literature, the ﬁrst (partial) derivative.
When written with a small letter, the subscript denotes the origin of the contribution, male and female.
6derivatives. The household production function H has marginal productivities Hhm > 0 and
Hhf > 0, with Hhmhm < 0 and Hhfhf < 0 and Hhmhf < 0 for the second derivatives. This last
assumption means that the contributions hm and hf to household work H are substitutes. To






Hhm = ¥. In the following, we will throughout assume interior equi-
libria where both spouses contribute to market work and household work and enjoy at least
some private leisure, e.g. we want to concentrate on double earner couples and therefore
exclude cases where one partner earns such a high wage that the other partner does not con-
tribute to household income.
The additive separability of the utility functions Um and U f ensures that all three time
uses (leisure, market work and household work) are “normal” in the sense that for an in-
crease in the time endowment T, the spouse increases her/his time commitment to all three
activities.8
Finally, notice that in our model both spouses are as symmetric as possible. Speciﬁcally,
we do not assume that one spouse has an intrinsic comparative advantage in household pro-
duction. Any asymmetry in our model is due only to a potential wage differential and to the
game structure which reﬂects the bargaining position of the spouses, and not to differences
in preferences.
3 The simultaneous game with equal bargaining
power
Each spouse maximizes utility (2) or (3) subject to the time budget constraint (1) for a given
contribution of the other spouse (Nash behavior). We obtain the following result when both
spouses choose their time allocation simultaneously:
Proposition 1
If both spouses have the same bargaining power and make their decisions simultaneously, the












Proof. Calculating the ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution and re-arranging leads
to condition (4).
Proposition 1 implies that, for equal wage rates of husband and wife, the same amounts
of leisure time result. This allows us to derive a testable hypothesis:
8This normality result guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the private provision game, see
Bergstrom et al. (1986).
7Hypothesis 1
Suppose both spouses choose their contributions simultaneously. Then the better paid spouse
should have less leisure time and we should observe similar amounts of leisure time in cou-
ples where the spouses have similar wage rates.
4 The sequential game with one dominant partner
What happens if one spouse has more bargaining power and is able to decide in the ﬁrst place
or his/her decision carries more power? Without loss of generality, let us call this Stackelberg
leader “husband”. The time structure of the game is the following:
1. The husband makes his choice about outside (money earning) work and household
work.
2. The husband’s choice is observed by his wife.
3. The wife chooses her optimal amount of work.
Since there is no uncertainty and the wife takes the decision of her spouse as given, we
solve the Nash equilibrium of this Stackelberg game backwards, calculating ﬁrst the wife’s
optimal behavior as the Stackelberg follower. Her ﬁrst order conditions are given by
¶U f(hm,hf,gm,gf)
¶gf
= −V0(lf)+wfG0 = 0 (5)
¶U f(hm,hf,gm,gf)
¶hf
= −V0(lf)+Hhf = 0, (6)
where the indices denote the partial derivative with respect to the variables and the arguments
are omitted for the sake of clarity. The budget constraint has been eliminated by setting
li =Ti−gi−hi,i=g,h. These ﬁrst order conditions implicitly deﬁne the wife’s best response
functions gf(gm,hm) and hf(gm,hm) for a given choice of the husband. By the implicit


































f )2. D is the determinant of
the 2x2 unbordered Hessian corresponding to the wife’s optimization problem. Our assump-
tions aboutV, G and H guarantee that the second order conditions for the wife’s optimization
problem are fulﬁlled, D is therefore positive.
That the reaction functions (7) and (10) are downward sloping is a well known fact in
the literature on the private provision of public goods.9 If the husband contributes more to
one public good, the wife has an incentive to reduce her contribution to this public good,
e.g. to do less out-of-home or household work, respectively. The reaction functions (8) and
(9) are different. Consider equation (8): If the husband contributes more to household work
dhm >0, this decreases the wife’s marginal utility of household work, since we have assumed
hf and hm to be substitutes. Therefore, the wife shifts time from household work into gainful
employment and leisure. Equation (9) shows that the wife reacts with an increased contri-
bution to household production if the husband makes a larger contribution to the common
income dgm > 0.
We can formulate the maximization problem of the Stackelberg leader as
maxUm(hm,gm) =V(lm)+G(wmgm+wfgf(gm,hm))+H(hm,hf(gm,hm)),

















Combining the four ﬁrst order conditions (5), (6), (11) and (12) we obtain the following
























¶hm reﬂect the sequential nature of the
game structure. If we eliminate those reaction functions by setting them zero, we arrive at
the solution (4) of the simultaneous game.
From the wife’s ﬁrst-order conditions (5) and (6) we obtain Hhf = wG0. The right hand


























9See for instance Bergstrom et al. (1986).
9In an analogous way, we transform the RHS of condition (14) and arrive at the following
proposition:
Proposition 2
Assume that (without loss of generality) the husband m can make his decisions in the ﬁrst























In the following, we will analyze several subcases of the sequential model. For this
purpose, let us deﬁne the husband’s wage and leisure time as functions of the wife’s corre-
sponding variables: the husband’s wage is wm = wf +Dw and the husband’s leisure time is
lm = lf +Dl. The variables Dw and Dl denote the wage gap and the leisure gap, respectively.
4.1 A negative wage gap
Consider ﬁrst the situation where the wife earns a higher wage than her partner: the wage
gap is negative. The husband earns less than his wife and he enjoys more leisure. Since the
ﬁrst term in condition (15) (the wage “ratio”) is smaller than one and the sum of the reaction
functions is always negative, the expression in (15) is smaller than one: the condition will
always be fulﬁlled as long as the husband earns a lower wage. The sequential Stackelberg
model makes a strong prediction: women outearning their husbands enjoy less leisure time
than their partners. A negative wage gap always leads to a positive leisure gap.
The sequential model provides an economic explanation for the ﬁndings of Brines (1994)
and Daly (1996) concerning couples where the female earns a higher wage and still enjoys
less leisure time than her partner. Intuitively, this is the case because the husband beneﬁts
both from his Stackelberg leadership and from his wife’s higher productivity in the market-
place.
4.2 Equal wages
Assume now for a ﬁxed female wage that the male wage increases and thus the wage gap
diminishes. The husband’s increased market productivity makes him shift some time to
market work. His wife reacts by reducing her commitment to market work and increasing
both household work and leisure time.
Consider now the special case where the market wages of both partners are equal, wm =
wf. Even when both partners have the same contribution costs to the public goods, we would
expect the husband to beneﬁt from his Stackelberg advantage. This amounts to a reduction
of his contributions to the public goods and to enjoying more leisure compared to the Nash






























Since “his” marginal utility of leisure is smaller than “her” marginal utility of leisure, the
husband as Stackelberg leader enjoys more leisure time than his wife lm > lf. Intuitively,
this is the case because, if the husband contributes more to the public good market work,
dgm > 0, this always leads to a greater (absolute) change of his wife’s commitment to G than











   < 1. (19)
Proposition 2 implies that, for equal wage rates of husband and wife, the husband uses his
Stackelberg advantage and reduces his contributions to the public goods, thereby enjoying
more leisure. This leads to the next testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2
Consider couples where the spouses have similar wage rates and assume that spouses choose
their contributions sequentially, because one spouse has a better bargaining position. We
expect that the spouse having a better bargaining position and thereby choosing ﬁrst enjoys
more leisure time than his/her partner.
4.3 A large, positive wage gap
For a very large wage differential it can be shown that the direct effect of the wage gap is
largerthanthe reactioneffect, thatis, theRHSof (16)isgreaterthan one. Inthissituation, the
husband enjoys less leisure than his spouse despite being the Stackelberg leader. Intuitively,
this happens because his market productivity is so much higher than his wife’s that it dillutes
his Stackelberg advantage.
We know from inequality (19) that, in absolute terms, the direct effect on gf of a change
of gm exceeds the indirect effect on hf. Since even the direct effect
¶gf
¶gm can never be greater
than 1, the bracketed term in inequality (17) is always negative, but never smaller than -1 .






















=⇒ V0(lm) > V0(lf) (21)
lm < lf (22)
For a “large enough” wage gap, the leisure gap is negative and the husband takes less free
time than his wife.
4.4 Comparative statics
How does the (leisure) time allocation change in reaction to an exogenous change of the
relative wages? Suppose the male wage increases, dgm > 0. The term with the wage ratio
on the RHS of (16) also adjusts to a wage change. If there were no further reactions, the
LHS would have to increase, e.g. the husband would shift time away from leisure. But the
reaction functions on the RHS of (16) also change with a wage change. In the following, we
turn to this more general case and analyze the effect of the wage gap on the leisure gap. We
can re-state the ﬁrst equilibrium condition of expression (15) corresponding to the sequential

















We obtain the following negative relationship between the wage gap and the leisure gap:
Proposition 3
Assume the following properties of the function G(wmgm+wfgf) which describes the con-
tribution of market income to utility: G000 > 0 and −wfgf
G000
G00 < 2. Then the leisure gap Dl








Basically, what Proposition 3 states is that the larger the wage gap, the lower the leisure
gap. As the male relative wage increases, the husband’s leisure time decreases and the wife’s
leisure disadvantage diminishes. Under additional assumptions, we obtain a monotonic re-
sult with respect to the leisure gap: For a negative wage gap (high earning women), husbands
enjoy more leisure (positive wage gap). If the male wage increases, the male’s leisure ad-
vantage decreases. For equal wages wm = wf, the husband still has more leisure because he
is able to extract a leisure rent from his Stackelberg leadership, even though both spouses
12have the same market productivity. If the male wage increases further, there will be a criti-
cal, large enough wage differential where the leisure gap Dl turns negative, e.g. the husband
enjoys less leisure than his spouse despite being the Stackelberg leader.
What is the intuition behind the additional requirements of Proposition 3? Suppose the
male wage rises and the husband increases his commitment gm to the joint household income.
The wife is better off, and the effect amounts to a time budget increase for the wife in units
of household income. Let us call this effect the “endowment effect” (in analogy to the usual
income effect, where, in our setting, income is time). By normality, the wife increases her
commitments to H (household work) and V (leisure), therefore raising her leisure time. But
this adjustment also makes the husband better off. If the additional conditions apply, the
endowment effect decreases in the male wage, and this ensures that the indirect reaction of
the wife to the male wage increase is small enough, leading to a smaller leisure gap. The
opposite effect works in a similar way: a female wage increase leads to a smaller leisure gap,
if the endowment effect increases in the female wage.
We summarize our results in the following conjecture:
Hypothesis 3
If both spouses choose their contributions sequentially and under the additional assumptions
of Proposition 3, we expect a negative, monotonic relationship between the wage gap and the
leisure gap.
5 Empirical Analysis
Theoretically, we have developed three testable hypotheses which allow us to discriminate
between the model where both spouses have the same bargaining power and the model where
one spouse is the dominant partner (the “simultaneous” and the “sequential” model, respec-
tively). For spouses earning a similar wage (a zero wage gap), the distribution of leisure gives
information about the bargaining situation in the couple (Hypothesis 1 vs. Hypothesis 2).
If Hypothesis 1 is rejected empirically and one spouse is the dominant partner, we can
check Hypothesis 3: When the husband earns less than his wife, the husband should enjoy
more leisure than his wife. The husband wins both from his Stackelberg leadership and
from his wife’s higher productivity in the marketplace. As the wage gap diminishes and
turns positive, the husband’s increased market productivity makes him shift some time from
leisure to market work. His wife reacts by reducing her commitment to market work and
increasing both household work and leisure time. For a large enough wage gap, the leisure
gap turns negative and the husband enjoys less free time than his wife.
We now investigate the relationship between the wage gap and the leisure gap with data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representative micro
data set of the German population, gathered since 1984 for West Germany and since 1990
for East Germany. While far from being competitive with a time use survey as regards infor-
13mation on the individual use of (leisure) time, the GSOEP has the advantage of containing
many additional socio-economic variables, e.g. the reported time spent on different activi-
ties as well as data on various sources of income, particularly earned income, and working
hours.10 This information is necessary to compute the hourly wage rate and, hence, the dif-
ference in wages between spouses. Due to changes in the questionnaire over time, only the
uneven years 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 yield comparable information on time use.11
Hence these ﬁve waves constitute our panel. We restrict the sample to couples (married or
cohabiting) where both spouses are in gainful employment and report a positive hourly wage
rate. It is further limited to adults between the age of 20 and 60 to prevent the results from
being excessively affected by education decisions and early retirement behavior, possibly
accompanied by special part time work arrangements.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the pooled sample with 5190 unweighted ob-
servations from 2810 couples. Wives are 39 of age on average, husbands almost 42. Men out-
earn women by 6.18 German marks (approx. 3.16 euro) in terms of hourly gross earnings.
41 percent of the wives in the sample work part time. 37 percent of all couples live in East
Germany which means that East Germans are over-represented both due to over-sampling as
well as a larger percentage of dual-earner couples in the Eastern part of Germany. A majority
of 83 percent is married. 5 percent have at least one child under 3 years of age, three ﬁfths of
which have no institutional care to rely on. 10 percent of couples live with a child age 4 to 6
and 25 percent with a child 7 to 12. As regards leisure time, we have different variables for
leisure to choose from. The ﬁrst variable is deﬁned in a very restrictive way: Respondents
are asked to report the average amount of time per day spent on TV and hobbies. We refer to
the reported hours as the genuine leisure time (leisure I). Therefore, we have constructed a
better measure of disposable or personal leisure time as the residual of total daily time minus
work activities (see the work categories in Footnote 11). This latter variable, called leisure II,
10Individual wage income, in particular, cannot be taken for granted in time use surveys. The German time
budget survey 1991/92 for instance did not include individual income sources.
11 The time use data in the respective years of the GSOEP are based on the following question: „How does
your typical (work-)day look like? How many hours do you spend on the following activities?
• occupation (including multiple jobs and commuting time),
• housework and shopping,
• child care,
• repairs at the house or the car and garden work,
• education, training,
• TV, hobbies.“
Hours and minutes are to be given for weekdays, saturdays and sundays separately by both the husband and
the wife. The 2001 wave additionally contains time spent with those in need of care. Other years do not
include saturday and/or sunday time use. Some years list different activities.
14Table 1: Sample characteristics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age wife 39.13 8.85 20.00 60.00
Age husband 41.66 9.16 20.00 60.00
Age difference 2.53 3.88 -14.00 26.00
Gross hourly wage wife 21.67 9.88 2.03 118.70
Gross hourly wage husband 27.84 12.81 2.11 154.07
Wage difference (h-w) 6.18 12.62 -102.71 134.30
Part time wife 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
East Germany 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Married 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00
Number of children 0.70 0.88 0.00 5.00
Child <3 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Child 4-6 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Child 7-12 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Child <3*No care 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Daily hours of leisure wife 1.81 1.41 0.00 12.29
Daily hours of leisure husband 1.90 1.45 0.00 10.00
Leisure gap (h-w) 0.09 1.35 -9.00 7.14
Disposable time per day (hours) wife 12.46 2.73 8.00 21.86
Disposable time per day (hours) husband 13.23 2.34 8.00 24.00
Disposable time gap (h-w) 0.77 2.53 -13.29 10.86
Notes: Sample of 5190 observations from 2810 dual-earner couples, age 20-60,
GSOEP waves 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001.
15includes genuine leisure as well as regeneration time (sleeping, eating etc.) and is censored at
a minimum of eight hours per day. Both variables reveal a positive gap for the husband. The
average husband enjoys a plus of 0.09 hours per day, that is about ﬁve minutes, of genuine
leisure time compared to his wife. The difference in disposable time amounts to 0.77 hours
(46 minutes) between the spouses.12
12Notice that the wage and leisure gaps, on their own, are not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. This is due
to the high variation in our data and is not the focus of our analysis. Our hypothesis does not consider the
wage and the leisure gap on its own, but the (negative) relationship between them, which may indeed be
both statistically and economically signiﬁcant (see McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996).
16Table 2: Estimation of the intra-family difference in dispos-
able time with random effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Expl. variables Coef. T-val. Coef. T-val. Coef. T-val. Coef. T-val. Coef. T-val.
Constant 0.842 18 1.049 9.51 0.513 4.52 0.525 4.63 -0.101 -0.47
Wage diff. (h-w) -0.013 -4.22 -0.015 -4.70 -0.015 -4.80 -0.016 -4.93 -0.020 -5.74
Wage level (wife) -0.009 -2.07 -0.003 -0.70 -0.003 -0.77 -0.008 -1.75
No. of children 0.159 2.45 0.154 2.38 0.147 2.25
Child <3 1.069 6.79 0.453 1.81 0.564 2.24
Child 4-6 0.861 6.80 0.863 6.82 0.930 7.23
Child 7-12 0.599 5.36 0.602 5.38 0.638 5.67
Child <3*No care 0.951 3.17 0.891 2.95
Married 0.136 1.22
Age wife 0.015 2.94
Age diff. (h-w) 0.029 2.77
East Germany -0.139 -1.49
R2 within 0.0009 0.0012 0.0213 0.0225 0.0223
R2 between 0.0045 0.0057 0.0771 0.0799 0.0875
R2 overall 0.006 0.0069 0.0545 0.0566 0.0627
Hausmann-Test c2-statistic (p-value) 15.55 0.1585
Notes: Sample of 5190 observations from 2810 dual-earner couples, age 20-60, GSOEP waves 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001.
1
7Table 2 reports the ﬁndings on the relationship between the leisure gap and the wage
gap between spouses in a panel regression while taking account of individual heterogeneity.
Individual effects are assumed exogenous in a random effects speciﬁcation (see below for
details on a ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation).
The ﬁrst model in Table 2 is our basic regression of the absolute difference between
husbands’ and wives’ disposable time (leisure II) on the absolute difference between gross
hourly wages as the only explanatory variable. Notice that the intercept is positive: for a zero
wage gap (equal wages), we thus obtain a positive leisure gap. This result rejects Hypothesis
1 (which predicts also a zero leisure gap) and is compatible with Hypothesis 2. Since, on
average, for equal wages the husband enjoys more leisure time than his wife, this means
according to our theory that it is the male spouse who has a better bargaining position within
the couple, which conﬁrms the observations in the sociological literature cited above. The
coefﬁcient of the wage gap is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. That
is, the larger the husband’s wage rate compared to his wife’s, the less leisure time he enjoys.
Both the positive intercept and the negative relationship between the wage gap and the leisure
gap are conﬁrmed in the following steps when supplementary variables are included in more
reﬁned estimation equations.
In addition to the wage difference we ﬁrst control for the wage level (Model 2). The
negative coefﬁcient estimate of the wage gap remains while the wage level is also neg-
atively related to the difference in disposable time. High-earning women face a smaller
intra-household inequality in leisure time, suggesting that women (and men) in high-income
households have more leisure than poorer households.
In Model 3, information on children in the household is added. The more children under
16 are present, the larger the leisure gap between mother and father. The presence of small
children up to 3 years adds further to this difference in a signiﬁcant magnitude. Older off-
spring has positive though smaller effects on the leisure gap: The older the age category the
smallertheestimatedcoefﬁcient. Whenincludinganinteractiontermforinfantsforwhomno
institutional care is available (Model 4), the coefﬁcient of the infant dummy is much smaller
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level only, implying that mothers’ leisure is not
only affected by the pure fact of having small children but mainly by not having them looked
after.
Model 5, ﬁnally, brings in several variables that are supposed to reveal some of the family
model idea the couple pursues. Being married, for instance, may be more likely among those
couples pursuing a more traditional role model where the husband is the main earner and
the wife carries responsibility for housework and child care. If the wife decides to take
on gainful employment in this setting, she has to deal with a double shift. The traditional
role model may also be more likely for older couples as reﬂected by the wife’s age in the
regression equation (cohort effect). The age difference between husband and wife is possibly
related to the extent to which human capital and job decisions have been made sequentially.
This variable may reﬂect the sequence in job search (ﬁrst the male “chauvinist”, then the
18female) as modeled in Frank (1978) mentioned above. In our analysis the wife’s age and
the spouses’ age difference are positively related to the leisure gap. In accordance with our
expectations the results indicate that older women and those who are much younger than their
husbands have relatively less time at their disposal. The variables ’being married’ and ’living
in East Germany’ yield no signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates. Further regressions13 show that
education, on the contrary, is not statistically signiﬁcantly related to the leisure gap, neither
the wife’s years in schooling nor the difference in schooling years between the husband and
the wife.
6 Discussion
The empirical results reject the hypothesis that men and women have equal bargaining power
and support our second, sequential decision model. Besides, the wage gap is found to have
an additional effect on the leisure gap within couples. However, we would like to discuss a
few possible complications and robustness tests we used to check our results.
Determinants of bargaining power. In our theoretical models, both the exogenous wage
gap and the time structure (e.g. the bargaining power) are the driving forces behind our re-
sults. The wage gap itself may determine the bargaining power situation within the couple.
Thus, the high-income spouse becomes the Stackelberg leader in the household’s time al-
location decision game. To check this possibility, we split our sample in three subsamples
corresponding to a positive, a zero, and a negative wage gap and estimate our model for the
subsamples. If the wage gap were the variable determining the bargaining power, we should
observe no effect on the leisure gap for a zero wage gap. But in the zero-wage-gap sam-
ple, the husband still has a “Stackelberg” advantage, thus rejecting the hypothesis that the
wage gap is the determinant variable. In line with the sequential job search argument it may
also be argued that the Stackelberg leader does not necessarily have to be the husband but
the older one of the two spouses. Thus we investigate whether the results are the same for
those couples where the the wife is older than the husband. Even here the hypothesis of the
Stackelberg advantage of the husband is supported.
Fixed effects model. It may be argued that in an analysis of the determinants of the
intra-family leisure gap the individual speciﬁc, or couple speciﬁc, effects shall be treated as
ﬁxed effects because couples’ preferences towards time allocation may differ systematically
ratherthanrandomly. Whenapplyingﬁxedinsteadofrandomeffects, time-constantvariables
cannot be analyzed as explanatory variables, though. Because the age difference of a couple
hardly changes between years, neither does being married or living in East Germany, these
variables cannot be included in a ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation. In any case, a Hausman test
13Available from the authors on request.
19on the hypothesis of the appropriateness of a random effects speciﬁcation cannot be rejected
(see the test statistic in Table 2).
Matchingbias. Afurthermatterofconcernmaybeapossible“matchingbias”inthedata:
possibly, couples do not match by chance, but instead partners with common social, cultural
or economic background marry each other. This self-selection effect would tend to equalize
all wage gaps and work against our ﬁndings. Thus, our results may even be underestimating
the link between the wage gap and the leisure gap.
East and West Germany. A control regression on a subgroup of full-time employed
women and men conﬁrms the previous results. For this subset, living in East Germany,
which is meant to take up the cultural aspect of family time use arrangements as well as the
greater availability of institutional child care, is also statistically signiﬁcantly related to the
leisure gap. On average, East German working couples experience a more equal distribution
of leisure time between spouses. In a second control regression, the inclusion of a variable
indicating whether the woman originates from East Germany does not reveal any correlation
with the leisure gap. Thus, the negative coefﬁcient of living in East Germany seems to cap-
ture the provision of public provision of child care rather than cultural differences between
the two regions.14
Extreme values. We also controlled for the possibility of outliers inﬂuencing our results.
Buteliminatingextremewagegapvalues(ofeithersign)didnotalterourresultssigniﬁcantly.
Summing up, all estimations and robustness checks lead us to reject the hypothesis that
spouses have the same bargaining power. Instead, the husband has a better bargaining po-
sition and enjoys more leisure time. Only when there is a large enough wage gap between
husband and wife, does his higher productivity at the market place lead to more leisure time
for his wife.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we explicitly model leisure time decisions of a couple. This allows us to estab-
lish a direct link between the leisure gap and the wage gap between spouses. We show that
even with equal wage rates men enjoy more leisure than their wives, but with larger wage
differentials, this leisure gap diminishes. This result is conﬁrmed empirically. Social struc-
tures in which the male makes the ﬁrst move lead to an intra-family time allocation that keeps
women out of full-time employment, because that maximizes their disposable free time or
minimizes their leisure reduction, respectively.
14The provision of all-day child care is much more extended in East than in West Germany, see Spieß et al.
(2002).
20Our model shows that gender inequality within the household cannot be abolished by
“simply” closing the wage gap between male and female employees, since even (or partic-
ularly) with a wage differential of zero, men dispose of more leisure. This result is due to
the husband’s advantage in deciding ﬁrst on his provision of the family public goods. Hence,
if the policy goal is to abolish gender inequality, social structures that deﬁne gender roles
decisive for asymmetries in family decision making will have to change. The gender-speciﬁc
leisure gap results not only from the pay differential between men and women, but also from
socially based gender inequality.
This asymmetric decision process, in which women usually adapt to the career needs of
their husbands, and the structural discrimination of women through lower wages together
foster a vicious circle since: “In as much as women’s work is consistently linked with lower
power, prestige, and material rewards than men’s work [...], men continue to enjoy advan-
tages in the control of their time by virtue of their status advantages.” (Daly (1996), p. 153).
Hence, the only way to break this vicious circle is to address simultaneously both the wage
gap and the asymmetry in the intra-family decision process.
Let us ﬁnally note that all results are derived within a static setting. In a dynamic con-
text, employment might also bear human capital effects that have private good character that
change the incentives of both spouses regarding their human capital investment (see Becker,
1985, Konrad and Lommerud, 2000, and Ott, 1992). Such a dynamic analysis points in a
possible direction of further research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, let us derive the effect of a change in the time endowment T on the optimal choice
of the wife with the help of equations (5) and (6). We will call this reaction “endowment
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whereD>0isthedeterminantfromabovecorrespondingtothewife’soptimizationproblem.








































D2 < 0 for Nm > 0, (32)
where Nf = (2wfG00+w2
fG000gf) and Nm = (w2
fG000gm). The expressions Nf and Nm are the
derivatives(withrespecttowf andwm respectively)ofthenumeratoroftheendowmenteffect
dlf
dT corrected for the term Hhfhf. Nf and Nm both determine the direction of the endowment
effect.























































































22We are interested in the change of Dl when the male wage wm increases or the female wage
wf decreases, leading to an increased wage gap. By the implicit function theorem we obtain
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Thus, an incresing wage gap leads to an increasing leisure gap, if the endowment effect as
given by (31) is positive with respect to wf and (32) is analogously negative with respect to
wm. That is, a higher female wage leads to a greater endowment effect and a higher male
wage leads to smaller endowment effects. The sign of the change of the endowment effects
depends on the signs of Nf = (2wfG00+w2
fG000gf) and Nm = (w2
fG000gm).
For Nm to be positive we assume a positive third derivative of G: G000 > 0. Then, a





G00 < 2. (40)
QED.
The expression on the left hand side of (40) resembles the coefﬁcient of relative prudence
as deﬁned by Kimball (1990). In the theory of precautionary saving under uncertainty, the
relative prudence inﬂuences the optimal variable choice under risk. In our setting, −wfgf
G000
G00
determines the comparative statics result of the wife’s optimal choice. If condition (40) holds
and her coefﬁcient of “relative prudence” is sufﬁciently small, then her endowment effect
increases in her wage and a higher female wage leads to the wife having less leisure. Of
course our setting is a setting under certainty, and we acknowledge that making assumptions
regarding the third derivative is not without problems. However, this cardinalization of utility
allows us to establish the monotonicity result given in Proposition 3.
23References
Apps, P. F. and R. Rees (1996), “Labour supply, household production and intra-family wel-
fare distribution,” Journal of Public Economics, 60(2):199–219.
Becker, G. S. (1965), “A theory of the allocation of time,” Economic Journal, 75:493–517.
Becker, G. S. (1976), The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Becker, G. S. (1985), “Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 3(1):33–58.
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian (1986), “On the private provision of public goods,”
Journal of Public Economics, 29:25–49.
Bolin, K. (1996), “An economic analysis of marriage and divorce,” Lund Economic Studies
no. 62.
Brines, J. (1994), “Economic dependency, gender, and the division of labor at home,” Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 100(3):652–688.
Buchholz, W., K. A. Konrad, and K. E. Lommerud (1997), “Stackelberg leadership and
transfers in private provision of public goods,” Review of Economic Design, 3:29–43.
Cornes, R. C. and T. Sandler (1984), “Easy riders, joint production, and public goods,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 94:580–598.
Daly, K. (1996), Families and Time: Keeping pace in a hurried culture, Sage Publications,
Thousand Oaks.
Elul, R., J. Silva-Reus, and O. Volij (2002), “Will you marry me? a perspective on the gender
gap,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49:549–572.
European Commission (2002), Employment in Europe 2002, Luxembourg.
Frank, R. H. (1978), “Why women earn less: The theory and estimation of differential
overqualiﬁcation,” American Economic Review, 68(3):360–373.
Hochschild, A. (1989), The Second Shift, Viking, New York.
Huber, J. and G. Spitze (1983), Sex Stratiﬁcation: Children, Housework and Jobs, Academic
Press, New York.
Juster, F. (1985), “Investments of time by men and women,” in Juster, F. and F. P. Stafford,
eds., Time, goods, and well-being, pp. 177–204, Institute for Social Research, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
24Juster, F. T. and F. P. Stafford (1991), “The allocation of time: Empirical ﬁndings, behavioral
models, and problems of measurement,” Journal of Economic Literature, XXIX:417–522.
Kimball, M. S. (1990), “Precautionary saving in the small and in the large,” Econometrica,
58:53–73.
Konrad, K. A. and K. E. Lommerud (1995), “Family policy with non-cooperative families,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(4):581–601.
Konrad, K. A. and K. E. Lommerud (2000), “The bargaining family revisited,” Canadian
Journal of Economics, 33(2):471–487.
Kooreman, P. and A. Kapteyn (1990), “On the empirical implementation of some game the-
oretic models of household labor supply,” Journal of Human Resources, 25(4):584–598.
Leuthold, J. (1968), “An empirical study of formula income transfers and the work decisions
of the poor,” Journal of Human Resources, 3:312–323.
Lommerud, K. E. (1997), “Battles of the sexes: Non-cooperative games in the theory of the
family,” in Research in Gender and Society, vol. 1. Economics of the family and family
policies, pp. 44–62, Routledge, London and New York.
Lundberg, S. and R. A. Pollak (1993), “Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage mar-
ket,” Journal of Political Economy, 101(6):988–1010.
Manser, M. and M. Brown (1980), “Marriage and hopusehold decision making: A bargaining
analysis,” International Economic Review, 21(1):31–44.
McCloskey, D. N. and S. T. Ziliak (1996), “The standard error of regressions,” Journal of
Economic Literature, XXXIV:97–114.
McElroy, M. B. and M. J. Horney (1981), “Nash bargained household decisions,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, 22(2):333–349.
O’Neill, J. (2003), “The gender gap in wages, circa 2000,” American Economic Review,
93(2):309–314.
Ott, N. (1992), Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions, Springer, Berlin-
Heidelberg-New York.
Ott, N. (1998), “Der familienökonomische Ansatz von Gary S. Becker,” in Pies, I. and
M. Leschke, eds., Gary Beckers ökonomischer Imperialismus, Mohr Siebeck.
Schäfer, D. and N. Schwarz (1996), “Der Wert der unbezahlten Arbeit der Privaten Haushalte
- Das Satellitensystem Haushaltsproduktion,” in Blanke, K., M. Ehling, and N. Schwarz,
eds., ZeitimBlickfeld-ErgebnisseeinerrepräsentativenZeitbudgeterhebung, vol.121, pp.
2515–69, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend
(Kohlhammer).
Spieß, C. K., F. Büchel, and J. R. Frick (2002), “Kinderbetreuung in West- und Ostdeutsch-
land: Sozioökonomischer Hintergrund entscheidend Bearbeiter,” DIW Berlin Wochen-
bericht Nr. 31/02.
Statistisches Bundesamt (1995), Die Zeitverwendung der Bevölkerung: Ergebnisse der Zeit-
budgeterhebung 1991/92, Tabellenbände I-IV.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2002), Löhne und Gehälter, Metzler Poeschel.
Topel, R. H. (1991), “Speciﬁc capital, mobility, and wages: wages rise with job seniority,”
Journal of Political Economy, 99:145–176.
United Nations (1995), Human Development Report 1995, Oxford.
Vagstad, S. (2001), “On private incentives to acquire household production skills,” Journal
of Population Economics, 14(2):301–312.
26